This is a CTP of initiative: BIEN/Vereniging Basisinkomen (Netherlands)
In October 1985, the Dutch Scientific Advisory Council (WRR), published a report on the future of social security in the Netherlands. This report called “Safeguarding Social Security” featured an elaborate account of basic income as a serious policy option to consider. The publication was a critical turning point as it brought the basic income in the Netherlands to another level.
As the WRR is an official advisory council to the government, its reports carried considerable political weight. Considerably more than the basic income promoters of the VBI. For them it was a great support, for the legitimization/reputation that the official report added to the otherwise rather marginal and radical concept. The interviewee tellingly describes this event in terms of a maturing discussion. “[The report] achieved that after that, the basic income started to play a role [in society] that it didn’t play before (…). Through the WRR publication, the basic income was reaching the public discussion on a much more mature level. That is to be attributed to that report, including all the lessons that can be drawn from it and considering all the dismissive reactions that it received.”
The more ‘mature’ discussion also implied the aforementioned ‘dismissive reactions’, significant controversy (see below) and the emergence of a discussion that was more business-like and focused on concrete ramifications. As the interviewee has also described in Groot & van der Veen (2001) (*), the report cast the basic income in a wholly different light. As a carefully engineered and socio-economically well-argued package of interventions in the social security system it took the basic income out of the principled political ‘niche’ in which it had developed thus far. Before the publication, the basic income discussion in the Netherlands took largely place in the form of social critique, but the WRR were the first to come with a ‘social engineering’ approach to it. “That idea of the basic income, it had mainly an ethical ring to it. It was something of people with a leftist profile, like the ‘league against working ethos’. They really came up with things like ‘paid work is a horrible thing’, it’s ‘degrading’, and ‘we should get rid of it’. They considered that ‘basic income offers that possibility, so we’re in favour of it’. They also considered the basic income as a cure to diseases related to overtime work, and as a way to improve mental health, indirectly, by changing economic conditions. Well, that was a bit the context, the discourse of those times…”
The interviewee describes the report as a very cogent, highly impressive combination of measures in which the proposal for a partial basic income – an unconditional income entitlement to all citizens yet not in itself sufficient for subsistence – was impressively combined with other welfare state reforms. So then they suddenly came with that idea that that basic income could be achieving what its academic advocates had always been saying it would, the neutralizing of the poverty trap, the simplification of social security, and the inclusion of the people at the lower end of the labour market…Well, all that, but, he also came up with that idea to have that basic income partially, so that it could possibly be acceptable to the people who weren’t very enthusiastic about the uncoupling of labour and income. Moreover, he managed to package all of that such that it would allow for an abolishment of the minimum wage, and act as a stimulus for the lowering of labour costs (emphasises)…which for the politicians was a very prominent theme.”
The ‘critical turning point’ nature of the publication should not be exaggerated, however. The interviewee describes it rather as a potential critical point in the Dutch basic income discussion, which was not meant to be however. He stresses that it was very timely and well thought through, but also was very vulnerable to criticisms. One tragic aspect about the so elaborate synthesis of it into a policy package was that it proved to be quite impenetrable and difficult to relate to:“But, the issue was, and that makes it also so important in hindsight, that all these things had been combined so very cleverly, but, it was a bit too little of everything. And, how all these things fitted together, (laughs), people just didn’t see it! People saw it rather like an indefinite, inanimate, thing…And that’s why it was rejected by everyone. The opponents rejected it, and even the proponents didn’t find any difficulty in declaring it out of order…”
(*) Groot L. & van der Veen, R. (eds.) (2001), Basic Income on the Agenda: Policy Objectives and Political Chances. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press
The publication of the report came as outside help to the predecessors of the Workplace Basic Income and the VBI (see next CTP). They hardly played a part in the societal debate that the report created, and the WRR had nothing to do with them. As a governmental advisory council the WRR could operate in relative isolation and freedom. The status of this actor made a big difference for the influence and legitimacy of the messages on the basic income communicated: “It is obvious that the WRR, in its capacity of an advisory council, makes a difference compared to the VBI. Or compared to a university…or compared to a short-lived group of activists. Because, it is the WRR, it is an independent governmental institute. Crafting this report on request of the government…so that is obvious. That doesn’t guarantee success of course, but it does guarantee attention.”
The influence of the WRR was only relative, though. As the interviewee underlines, its influence is only as significant as the media and political actors allow it to become. Regarding the first:“You can see that the press was on top of it. As the press was aware that that report of the WRR…Reports requested by government, of course these always receive attention by the press, as a matter of routine.” The receptiveness of the press amplified the influence of the publication considerably. On the other hand, the burst of media coverage and exposure also led to a dynamic in which the report publication became a very short-lived critical turning point: It evoked a fast-paced series of reactions by politicians and political parties, in which every party came up with objections to particular elements of the proposals. The media coverage created a ‘buzz in the corridors’ of national parliament in the Hague that ran ahead of the more elaborate parliamentary discussion of the report that is normal procedure for WRR reports. The window of opportunity closed very soon after it was opened.“ Within 24 hours after the report has been published, and before the government even had formulated its response, - to which it is obliged, and on short notice it should be discussed with parliament, there’s little time in between that-, well, even then one heard already many signals in ‘the Hague circles’ of ‘no, this isn’t what we want’. And then the press approaches the proponents for a reaction – not the VBI, no, the PPR political party. The PPR was at the time a proponent of the basic income, and the one who was particularly eloquent in his writings and talks about the topic was Bram van Ojik, the later leader of the Green Left party. So they ended up with him, but he didn’t find it that great either. He found [the proposed BI] too little to live from…as it formed part of a more encompassing arrangement of which one could actually see in advance that it was not intended to be gradually increased [towards a more than partial basic income]…”
The eventually very limited political and societal acceptance of the report hinged on its resonance and dissonance with several broader societal developments. Regarding the first, the proposal for the partial came very timely. As mentioned under [description], it played into the high political priorities of lowering labour costs, untangling of the complex and inefficient welfare state bureaucracy, and the increasing problems of social exclusion. Moreover, the proposal played into the societal crisis of high structural unemployment.“It came right after a peak in unemployment in the Netherlands, I think it was 7,5 % unemployed back then in 1985, and in 1984 it was near 9%. And then it very soon went downwards again, that is what you always have in the Netherlands, it moves along with the international conjuncture….” On the other hand, the felt need for drastic measures against unemployment soon receded along with the unemployment. Moreover, the proposal was also in stark dissonance with several political trends. The most important of those (described under [contestation]) was that the political consensus had moved towards welfare state reforms focused on cutbacks within the prevailing framework, stimulation of employment, and maintenance of the minimum wage. The uncoupling of labour and income, the income without obligation of searching for paid labour that basic income amounts to, had recently been firmly reasserted across the political spectrum as a political taboo.
The impact of the published report on the Dutch basic income was obviously co-produced by a wide range of actors, and shaped by a multitude of societal developments that counted as political arguments in favour or against the WRR proposal and its various elements. The number of related events is very high if one considers alone the numerous newspaper reports, background articles, academic analyses and political utterances that were evoked by the report and that preceded it. Van der Veen & Groot (2001) provide a more detailed account. The following events are particularly telling, highlighting the significance of the report for the overall timeline.
First of all, there was the development of a basic income discourse largely in the shape of social critique (1975-1985), which has fuelled the report with arguments. The VBI and its members have played a part in the development of that very ethics-centered discourse.
Second, there was the high unemployment of the early 1980s that created the societal crisis and broadly felt need for drastic interventions in the Dutch social security system. Against the background of unemployment rising from 6 to 12%, basic income appeared as a reasonable alternative to ineffective ‘workfare’ policies focused on employability (and conditional entitlements to unemployment benefits).
Third, there was the political consensus since the ‘Wassenaar agreement’ in 1982. This had pacified political right and left into a socio-economic course premised on expenditure-cutting more than radical transformations in the Welfare State arrangements. As indicated by Groot & van der Veen (2001: 150), “..the government had committed itself to passing an expenditure-cutting reform of existing social security. The reform basically relied on keeping intact the two-tiered Dutch system, but with more selectivity, lower benefit levels and shorter duration of entitlements in the social insurance and universal benefits. Because of this, the government could not think of abolishing the minimum wage, which was, after all, the linchpin of the existing system.” The proposed partial income clashed with this, both for its replacing of the minimum wage with a partial income and for its increase in social expenditures. The proposal came too late (ibidem: 152), as the decision-making trajectory towards the alternative policy reforms had already been set in motion.
Fourth, and this was the crucial ‘event’ or phase evoked by the WRR publication, the discussion on the basic income had reached more maturity. This meant that the basic income had become a common reference in Dutch politics and society more broadly, and that the discussion turned towards economic and administrative feasibility. The establishment of the ‘Workplace Basic Income’ in 1987 (see CTP) and the various publications of its members testify an increasing debate and especially increasing academic development of the basic income concept.
Fifth, the political debate (see under [contestation]) on the WRR proposals did not bring a breakthrough towards implementation. On the contrary, even. In terms of moving up the political agenda, the following years 1986-1992 were ‘seven lean years’ (Groot & van der Veen 2001: 153) as the massive rejection of the proposal created a certain backlash. The basic income had become a common reference, but also a quite notorious and politically sensitive concept – not one to be associated with.
The crafting and the reception of the WRR proposal display very instructively how difficult it is to have radical ideas like the basic income accepted as a viable policy option. The proposal met with fierce resistance. Nevertheless, the interviewee reminds that the massive criticisms of the proposal should not overshadow how it was actually anticipating much of those, and how it took into account important several political trends. It was, even if proving much too radical to the taste of the vast majority, to a certain extent a compromise and an attempt to avoid contestation. As described earlier under [contents], the main author had synthesized several policy priorities, and deliberately went for a partial basic income. “..he also came up with that idea to have that basic income partially, so that it could possibly be acceptable to the people who weren’t very enthusiastic about the uncoupling of labour and income”.
However smartly designed and intended as a compromise, the proposal was considered to fall short on various accounts. The first one was the lack of a principled underpinning. As described under [contents], the carefully designed policy package lacked a clear statement, a political message, a ‘soul’ or a recognizable set of values through which it would stick with people. It lacked an principled-ethical argumentation, which could have helped to ease the contestation on the fairness of the proposals.
Second, the report also met with considerable contestation for the lack of economical-financial argumentation and quantitative evidence. It failed to provide the calculative underpinning of the proposals, involving effects on the national economic development, labour market effects and eventually the affordability. The interviewee understands why the WRR refrained from providing numbers – but also stresses how the WRR underestimated the resistance this would evoke. “The failure to attach an appendix on the economic feasibility of the basic income, that was number two…They didn’t want to do that. As they said ‘it is not so easy to calculate, the only thing we can say about it is that we’re not perceiving risks in it’…Well, that is really great, it is just very frank, it is really what I deeply feel that needs to be said. A lot of economists said however, ‘but that is not how things work in the Netherlands... When it’s election time all political parties have their programs vetted and calculated through by the Central Planning Bureau, which goes into the very details, and all that with a 40 year horizon’. You see, all of that plays a part in the political discussion. And if then there is suddenly one, the Scientific Council for Government policy (WRR), to claim self-assuredly ‘but we’re not having any of that’, then, well, then the whole account is just very weak. Reactions are then predictably like (mimics) ‘Oh? Oh? Really? So that is what you want? Well, now that’s interesting…’”
Finally, the WRR proposal displayed another issue of contestation that proposals for a basic income have brought up more often. The partial basic income formed part of more broader reforms, involving amongst others tax reforms (for the financing of the basic income, but also as a purposeful reform in itself) and a phasing out of the minimum wage (which would be replaced by the partial basic income arrangement). The so carefully thought through combination of welfare state reforms thus evoked considerable controversy over the negative side-effects it would have – throughout the whole cluster of welfare state institutions targeted for reform.“One sees it everywhere where the basic income is at issue…if you’re aiming to introduce the basic income accompanied with all kinds of other reforms of existing institutions, such as the tax system, for example, ‘let’s go for a fundamental greening of the tax system’, or ‘we’ll completely shift it from a labour-based to a consumption-based system’, which has been discussed Switzerland. Well, that is very risky, as, the people sitting behind the switching board also have a certain number of other things to do, for which these institutions also have a certain function. And if you don’t take that into account, you’re basically paving the way towards rejection. The rejection can be easily justified towards the public by ‘well, that basic income tries to uncouple labour and income, that is undesirable, after all’. So then the rejection is then not only based on the rejection of the uncoupling of labour and income, but also on the connection that basic income makes (...) with entirely other matters that [by themselves] are controversial and difficult-to-reform.”
Before the publication of the WRR report there had already been various publications, public utterances and discussion meetings. In the decade before a basic income discourse had already developed in the Netherlands. The WRR took the discussion to another level however, and took it beyond the social critique into the realm of feasibility and weighing of consequences.
From the perspective of transformative social innovation, it is striking how this important event in the development of the basic income in the Netherlands came entirely as a surprise to the (as yet not organized) social innovation activists. “And then suddenly, without anyone counting on it, you had that professor Douben, the main author of that report, who suddenly came with that idea that that basic income could be achieving what its academic advocates had always been saying it would..”
As described above, the intervention amounted to an empowerment to the otherwise marginal and fragmented basic income movement from quite unexpected quarters. As another longstanding VBI member indicated in his account of the establishment of the VBI predecessor (link), it was a ‘gift from heaven’ to them.
As unexpected as it came to basic income promoters, as soon the political window of opportunity closed again. The interplay of intensive media coverage and quick political positioning made for a very short-lived burst of debate on the basic income. As a (retired) university professor in political philosophy, the interviewee is very eloquent in explaining the ambivalences of the supposed critical turning point. On the one hand, it was a critical turning point in bringing the debate to a new level, in creating a more mature discourse, and in establishing the basic income as a common reference in Dutch political life. On the other hand, the proposal was shot down very soon, evoked huge controversy, and actually contaminated the basic income as a concept for social security reforms. Not only did it not lead to a political breakthrough, it was even followed by a certain setback. The interviewee, as an academic specialist very capable of appreciating the subtleties of the WRR analysis, seems to think that the report had a greater ‘critical turning point’ potential than what came out eventually – if only the presentation of the ideas had been better attuned to political reality...”So, well…then one can say in hindsight, it is a pity that they approached it the way they did. Yet, on the other hand, it was just such a highly coherent account that they presented! I am still deeply impressed by it, when I read it again, it is very smart…just thought up very well (laughs).”
The interviewee is a longstanding VBI member, but also one of the basic income researchers and academics that form the core of BIEN as a transformative social innovation network. Accordingly, he has learned a lot of the discussions that followed upon the WRR report publication: For example about the particular kinds of resistance that the proposals evoked, and their roots in political-ethical convictions (such as the strong convictions in the Netherlands that ‘one should earn one’s income’, that ‘labour should pay’, and that ‘everybody has the right to paid labour’). In Groot & van der Veen (2001) he and a colleague tellingly describe how the basic income turned out as a ‘lightning rod’, attracting a multitude of criticisms. The rejections, in their multitude and their diversity, are in this academic perspective of great importance. They help to refine the concept, and the ethical-political principles to which it appeals.
As indicated earlier, the interviewee has also learned several lessons about the ways in which the basic income should and shouldn’t be presented. One striking lesson was the importance of a clear principled underpinning, or clarification of the values to which the so complex proposal was appealing (e..g. solidarity, efficiency of welfare state bureaucracy, social inclusion, greening of the economy, etcetera – many norms and strivings were involved).
The most significant lesson for the practice of promoting the basic income pertained to the political importance of numbers and evidence. Especially in the Dutch political culture, it proved crucial to underpin, substantiate and justify the transformative social innovation – which aimed for major replacements in socio-economic institutions that as such needed economic justification. “Well, there is the lesson in the general sense that one can’t claim too much for an innovative proposal if it isn’t accompanied with a few good calculations, which mange to impress economists and politicians. That is something that definitely has become apparent, also with the current VBI. If you see what they are publishing now, that is always accompanied with a calculation”.
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